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INTRODUCTION 
Under the indifference principle in contract law, the remedies for 
breach of contract should “leave the [promisee] absolutely indifferent, in 
subjective terms, between having the defendant breach and pay damages or 
having the defendant perform.”1 This principle underlies the expectation-
based remedies that are central to contract law—in particular, the expecta-
tion measure of damages, which serves as a surrogate for the “indifference 
principle.”2 
Traditional economic analysis recognized that the expectation measure 
is supported by strong reasons of efficiency.3 Recently, however, some law-
and-economists have criticized the expectation measure, and by implication 
the indifference principle, on instrumental grounds. The criticisms fall into 
two categories. Some critics argue that the goals of the indifference princi-
ple would be best served by modifying the expectation measure.4 Other 
critics argue that contract law should aim to achieve other goals entirely and 
then develop alternative economic models and remedial regimes based on 
  
 1. Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient 
Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629, 636 (1988); see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, Actual and Vir-
tual Specific Performance, the Theory of Efficient Breach, and the Indifference Principle in 
Contract Law, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 975, 979-80 (2005). For a variety of reasons, the expecta-
tion measure is an imperfect surrogate for the indifference principle, but for ease of exposi-
tion, we will use the two terms more or less interchangeably unless the context indicates 
otherwise. Also for ease of exposition, we will use the term contract in this Article to mean a 
bargain contract. 
 2. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 979-80. 
 3. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, at 55-56 (1st ed. 
1972). 
 4. See infra Part II. 
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those goals.5 Part I of this Article briefly summarizes the strengths of the 
indifference principle and the expectation measure. Parts II and III consider 
prominent alternative models and remedial regimes. 
This Article has a substantive and a methodological aspect. The sub-
stantive aspect analyzes the validity of the alternative models and regimes 
apart from questions of administrability and institutional issues. The meth-
odological aspect examines the administrability of these models and re-
gimes and the congruence between the models and regimes, on the one 
hand, and institutional considerations, on the other. 
I. THE INDIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE AND THE EXPECTATION MEASURE 
In this Part, we briefly discuss the instrumental and noninstrumental 
strengths of the indifference principle and the expectation measure. The 
instrumental strengths consist of efficient incentives for performance and 
precaution and support for investment in surplus-enhancing reliance. The 
noninstrumental strength consists of the promotion of fairness between con-
tracting parties. 
A. Efficient Rate of Performance by Promisors 
After a contract has been formed, events may give a promisor an in-
centive not to perform. For example, the promisor’s cost of performance 
may increase significantly, or a new and more profitable opportunity may 
arise that is available to the promisor only if she breaches her contract with 
the promisee. Contracts are designed to enhance the wealth, or surplus, of 
the contracting parties. Accordingly, a decision to breach rather than to per-
form should account for the effect of the decision on the joint surplus that 
would result from performance. The expectation measure accomplishes this 
objective because it causes the promisor to consider not only the benefits of 
breach to her, but also the resulting costs and loss of benefits to the promi-
see. At least in theory, therefore, that measure efficiently sweeps the con-
tract’s entire value into the promisor’s calculus of self-interest and thereby 
provides efficient incentives for a promisor’s perform-or-breach decision.6 
  
 5. See infra Part III. Many of the alternative models and regimes are synthesized, 
elaborated, or developed in Richard Craswell, Instrumental Theories of Compensation: A 
Survey, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1135 (2003). 
 6. For a more formal introduction to the ways in which the expectation measure 
promotes efficient rates of performance, see ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & 
ECONOMICS 247-49 (5th ed. 2008). 
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B. Efficient Rate of Precaution by Promisors 
One reason that a promisor may breach is that the contract has become 
unprofitable to her because of some unwelcome event that increases her 
costs but does not constitute an excuse for nonperformance. Often the prom-
isor could have forestalled this reason for breach if she had taken appropri-
ate precautions against the occurrence of the relevant event.7 Precaution 
involves costs in the form of money, time, and effort. From an efficiency 
standpoint, however, these costs must be balanced against the resulting ben-
efit—a reduction in the probability of breach, and a consequent enhance-
ment of the likelihood that the potential joint surplus under the contract will 
be realized. The expectation measure provides an incentive for an efficient 
rate of precaution for the same reason that it provides an incentive for an 
efficient rate of performance.8 Incentives for precaution are efficient if they 
compel the promisor to balance the cost of precaution against the cost of 
failing to take precaution, including the cost of the increased risk to the 
promisee of losing his share of the prospective joint surplus. By placing that 
increased risk on the promisor, the risk will be swept “into the promisor’s 
calculus of self-interest in making decisions on” how much precaution to 
take.9 
C. Surplus-Enhancing Reliance by Promisees 
Once a contract has been made, a contracting party may take various 
actions in reliance upon it. Some of these actions are required by the con-
tract, but others are within the party’s discretion. Discretionary reliance 
typically enables the promisee to increase the surplus that he will derive 
from the contract. Goetz and Scott developed this concept and called it ben-
eficial reliance.10 An equivalent term is surplus-enhancing reliance. Here is 
an example: The Blue Angels, a rock group, contracts with Promoter to give 
a concert in three months. Promoter can greatly increase box-office receipts, 
and therefore the value of the contract, by advertising the concert in ad-
  
 7. See generally Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model 
of Precaution, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1985) (comparing the incentives provided by expectation 
damages to take precautions against breach with incentives provided by tort law to take 
precautions against accidents). 
 8. Melvin A. Eisenberg & Brett H. McDonnell, Expectation Damages and the 
Theory of Overreliance, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1335, 1336, 1361-62 (2003). 
 9. Id. at 1336.  
 10. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the 
Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1266-67 (1980). 
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vance. Advertising therefore constitutes surplus-enhancing reliance.11 A 
promisor may also benefit from the promisee’s surplus-enhancing reliance 
because some of the projected enhanced surplus may be impounded into the 
price the promisee is willing to pay. In The Blue Angels, for example, Pro-
moter may pay The Blue Angels a higher fee than he otherwise would if he 
can confidently spend money on advertising, which will increase his ex-
pected receipts and therefore his expected profits.  
The expectation measure supports a promisee’s investment in benefi-
cial reliance. A promisee who knows that expectation damages give the 
promisor strong and appropriate incentives to perform, and to take appropri-
ate precaution against breach, can be more confident that his investment in 
surplus-enhancing reliance is not subject to an undue risk of loss. The prom-
isee therefore will be more willing to make the investment. 
D. Fairness 
Finally, there are strong reasons of fairness for a remedial regime 
based on the indifference principle. If A has rendered a bargained-for per-
formance to B, we know that A was willing to render that performance to B 
for the agreed-upon price. We cannot know whether A would have rendered 
that performance to B for any lesser price. Requiring A to accept any lesser 
price would therefore unfairly convert A from a voluntary to an involuntary 
actor because if A had known in advance that the contract price was not 
enforceable in full, he might not have agreed and performed. Even where A 
has only partially performed, he may have done so because he expected full 
payment; and even where A has not yet begun to perform, he may have re-
lied on the contract by forgoing or failing to explore other opportunities 
whose value is now difficult to quantify. In these cases, too, fairness nor-
mally requires that A be allowed to measure damages based on the price that 
induced him to act or forbear. In many or most cases, allowing a promisor 
to limit damages to less than the promisee’s expectation would also have the 
same unfair quality as allowing a promisor to renege on a fair bet that he 
made and lost.12  
 
* * * 
 
In short, there are strong and widely accepted reasons for believing 
that the expectation measure provides promisors and promisees with incen-
tives for efficient performance and precaution, and provides promisees with 
  
 11. For a more complete discussion of the implications of beneficial reliance on 
efficient damages, see Eisenberg & McDonnell, supra note 8, at 1340, from which this ex-
ample is drawn. 
 12. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 980. 
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support for efficient investment in surplus-enhancing reliance. Within recent 
years, however, some law-and-economists have argued either that important 
revisions need to be made in the expectation measure to better attain these 
goals or that contract law should pursue other goals entirely. In Part II, we 
consider some of the former arguments; in Part III, some of the latter. 
A major weakness of recent alternative remedial models and regimes 
is that they ignore noninstrumental considerations, and in particular, fair-
ness. That having been said, in the balance of this Article we will consider 
the alternative damages models and regimes on their own instrumental 
terms because analyses based solely on those terms are sufficient to demon-
strate that the models and regimes are gravely flawed. 
II. CRITIQUES OF THE EXPECTATION MEASURE THAT AIM TO BETTER 
IMPLEMENT THE INDIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE 
A. The Theory of Overreliance 
One critique of the expectation measure that is basically designed to 
better implement the indifference principle, rather than to replace it, is the 
theory of overreliance. This theory is as follows:  
(i) If a promisor breaks a bargain contract, the promisee will ordinarily sue for 
expectation damages, not reliance damages; however, the promisee’s lost 
profits, and therefore his expectation damages, may be higher if he has en-
gaged in surplus-enhancing reliance.13 
(ii) There is always some probability that a promisor will breach.14 
(iii) The expectation measure fully insures a promisee against the promisor’s 
breach.15 
(iv) This full insurance allows a promisee to ignore the probability that a promisor 
will breach, and therefore gives the promisee an incentive to invest in surplus-
enhancing reliance at a level that is inefficient because it does not take that 
probability into account. To put this differently, the expectation measure may 
lead a promisee to inefficiently overrely; that is, to overinvest in surplus-
enhancing reliance.16 
(v) In contrast, an efficient remedial regime would require a promisee to calibrate 
his investment in reliance according to the probability that the promisor will 
breach.17 
  
 13. Eisenberg & McDonnell, supra note 8, at 1338, 1341. 
 14. Id. at 1337. 
 15. Id. at 1338. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON. 
466, 469-72 (1980); Steven Shavell, The Design of Contracts and Remedies for Breach, 99 
Q.J. ECON. 121, 123-24 (1984) [hereinafter Design of Contracts]. 
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The theory of overreliance was developed by Steven Shavell.18 It is a 
refinement of, rather than a counter to, the expectation measure. The theory 
is sound in principle, but when administrability and other institutional con-
siderations are taken into account, the theory has a very limited ambit.19 
1. Cases in Which Overreliance Is Impossible 
To begin with, overreliance is often impossible. For example, expecta-
tion damages are often invariant to reliance. Where that is the case, an in-
crease in the promisee’s beneficial reliance will not increase his expectation 
damages, and the prospect of expectation damages therefore will not give 
the promisee an incentive to overrely. Take, for example, a seller’s damages 
for a buyer’s breach of a contract for the sale of goods. Sellers rarely suffer 
compensable consequential damages, because “‘[a] buyer’s usual default is 
failure to pay. In normal circumstances, the disappointed seller [of goods] 
will be able to sell to another, borrow to replace the breaching buyer’s 
promised payment, or otherwise adjust its affairs to avoid consequential 
loss.’”20  
Accordingly, in the case of a contract for the sale of goods, a seller 
normally cannot increase its consequential damages by overreliance. More-
over, a seller also normally cannot increase its general damages by overreli-
ance. Three alternative formulas can be employed to calculate a seller’s 
general damages for a buyer’s breach of a contract for the sale of goods. 
One formula is the difference between the unpaid contract price and the 
market price at the time and place for tender.21 A second is the difference 
between the contract price and the price that the seller realizes on a resale to 
a third party that satisfies certain conditions.22 Under both these formulas, a 
seller cannot increase its recovery by investing in beneficial reliance, be-
cause contract price, market price, and resale price are all normally invariant 
to beneficial reliance. The third formula is the variable costs incurred by the 
seller prior to the buyer’s breach plus the seller’s expected profit as meas-
ured by the difference between the contract price and seller’s total variable 
costs.23 An increase in a seller’s variable costs will increase the costs-
  
 18. Design of Contracts, supra note 17, at 123-24. 
 19. The discussion of the theory of overreliance in this Section is an adaptation and 
revision of portions of Eisenberg & McDonnell, supra note 8, which includes a much more 
extensive critique of the theory. See also Aaron S. Edlin, Cadillac Contracts and Up-Front 
Payments: Efficient Investment Under Expectation Damages, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 98, 98 
(1996). 
 20. Eisenberg & McDonnell, supra note 8, at 1349-50 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-710 
preliminary cmt. 2 (Proposed Amendments 2001)). 
 21. U.C.C. § 2-708(1) (2012).  
 22. § 2-706. 
 23. See § 2-708(2). 
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incurred element of this formula, but it will drive down the lost profit ele-
ment by an equal amount, so that here too a seller’s damages will normally 
be invariant to his beneficial reliance. 
The analysis for a seller’s damages in services contracts is very simi-
lar. Such damages can be calculated using several alternative formulas. One 
such formula is based on the variable costs incurred by the seller prior to the 
buyer’s breach, plus the seller’s expected profit as measured by the differ-
ence between the contract price and seller’s total variable costs. An increase 
in a seller’s variable costs will increase the costs-incurred element of this 
formula but will drive down the lost profit element by an equal amount, so 
that here too a seller’s damages will normally be invariant to his beneficial 
reliance. An algebraically equivalent formula is the difference between the 
contract price and the variable costs remaining to be incurred by the seller at 
the time of breach.24 As in the cases of contracts for the sale of goods, the 
contract price, market price, and resale price are invariant to the seller’s 
reliance, and an increase in costs prior to breach will increase the costs-
incurred element of the seller’s recovery but decrease the profit element. 
Accordingly, the seller cannot overrely, for comparable reasons.  
In short, under the damage formulas that are applicable to breach by a 
buyer of goods or services, the expectation measure normally cannot give a 
seller an incentive to overinvest in reliance. Accordingly, overreliance can 
almost never be a problem in the case of a breach by half of all contracting 
parties—that is, by buyers. 
In the case of breach by sellers of goods or services, overreliance by a 
buyer is possible but often unlikely. Overreliance normally cannot increase 
the buyer’s general damages because (as in the case of the seller’s damages) 
those damages are measured by formulas that are invariant to the buyer’s 
investment in beneficial reliance. One formula for measuring a buyer’s gen-
eral damages for breach by a seller is based on the difference between the 
contract price and the market price at the time when the buyer learned of the 
breach.25 A second formula is based on the difference between the contract 
price and the cover price where the buyer covers.26 A third formula, dimin-
ished-value damages, is based on the difference between the market value 
of the performance that the seller promised and the market value of the per-
formance that the seller rendered.27 A fourth formula, cost-of-completion 
  
 24. There are wrinkles in these general-damages formulas, which concern payments 
by the buyer prior to the breach. These wrinkles do not affect the present discussion and are 
omitted for ease of exposition.  
 25. E.g., U.C.C. § 2-713. 
 26. U.C.C. § 2-711. 
 27. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 348(2)(a) (1981). As in the case 
of the seller’s damages, there are wrinkles in the formulas, but they can be ignored for pre-
sent purposes. 
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damages, is based on the amount required to put the seller’s imperfect per-
formance into the promised state.28 Under any of these formulas, an increase 
in the buyer’s investment in beneficial reliance normally will not increase 
the buyer’s general damages, because normally contract price, market price, 
cover price, diminished value, and cost of completion are all invariant to the 
buyer’s beneficial reliance. Accordingly, where a buyer can recover only 
general damages, as is often the case, he has no incentive to overrely.  
2. Cases in Which Overreliance, Although Possible, Is Very Unlikely 
to Occur 
Unlike a seller’s general and consequential damages and a buyer’s 
general damages, a buyer’s consequential damages may be increased by 
investment in beneficial reliance. In practice, however, in many or most 
cases overreliance by a buyer is very unlikely to occur because even where 
a buyer’s profits will vary with his investment in beneficial reliance, it 
would often be inefficient for the buyer to take the seller’s probability of 
breach into account in determining how much beneficial reliance he should 
invest in. This is specifically true in cases involving lumpy reliance or coor-
dinated contracts. It is more generally true because expectation damages do 
not perfectly insure promisees. 
a. Lumpy Reliance 
The theory of overreliance implicitly assumes that reliance expendi-
tures are continuous. In the real world, however, these expenditures are of-
ten lumpy (that is, non-continuous). If a buyer’s investment in surplus-
enhancing reliance occurs in lumps that cannot feasibly be scaled down at 
the margin, it will usually be inefficient for the buyer to take the seller’s 
probability of breach into account in determining the amount of his reliance. 
To illustrate, “[s]uppose Boatmaker agrees to build a commercial yachtto 
be named Seafarerfor [Mariner], who plans to charter out the yacht for 
luxury cruises.”29 Mariner cannot charter out Seafarer unless the vessel is 
equipped with a customized radar and ten expensive high-tech life preserv-
ers, all of which Mariner, rather than Boatmaker, is responsible for.30 As-
sume Mariner will earn a profit of $30,000 per month from chartering Sea-
farer. The radar must be ordered two months in advance, and the life pre-
servers must be ordered four weeks in advance. The probability that Boat-
maker will breach is 10%. If Boatmaker breaches and Mariner must resell 
the radar and life preservers on the market, Mariner will take a loss of 
  
 28. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 348(2)(b) (1981). 
 29. Eisenberg & McDonnell, supra note 8, at 1340. 
 30. This example is drawn from Eisenberg & McDonnell, supra note 8, at 1354. 
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$6,000 on the radar and $500 on the life preservers. On these facts, if Mari-
ner does not order a radar until Seafarer is delivered, he will lose two 
months of profits, or $60,000. Since Mariner cannot purchase 90% of a ra-
dar, he should order the radar in advance despite the 10% chance that 
Boatmaker will breach. Similarly, Mariner should order ten life preservers, 
despite the 10% chance that Boatmaker will breach, because nine life pre-
servers will not do Mariner any good. 
b. Coordinated Contracts 
A similar problem arises where a buyer must enter into a number of 
coordinated contracts. In these cases it is normally inefficient for the buyer 
to enter into less than all the contracts even if there is a positive probability 
of breach for each contract. For example, suppose that to make a movie a 
producer needs to make contracts with a writer, a director, five actors, a 
cinematographer, a composer, and a film editor, and each artist has a 10% 
probability of breach.31 If production could not begin until all ten artists had 
signed contracts, it would be inefficient for the producer to make contracts 
with only nine artists.32 
c. Highly Limited Insurance 
That overreliance can occur only in a very limited range of cases 
leaves the theory of overreliance unaffected in principle, although highly 
circumscribed in practice. But there is also a flaw in a central tenet of the 
theory: that the expectation measure fully insures a promisee’s investment 
in reliance. It is this supposed feature of the expectation measure that is said 
to lead to overreliance. For example, Richard Craswell states that 
“[b]ecause the expectation measure guarantees [the promisee] B full com-
pensation whether [the promisor] S performs or not . . . it means that B can 
ignore the risk that S’s nonperformance might leave B’s reliance expendi-
tures wasted,”33 and that “expectation damages allow B to capture all of the 
upside potential of his reliance without making him bear any of the down-
side potential.”34 
If institutional factors are taken into account, however, the full-
insurance tenet is incorrect. When a promisee determines how much to in-
vest in beneficial reliance, he cannot rationally expect that his investment 
  
 31. Id. at 1355. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Richard Craswell, Performance, Reliance, and One-Sided Information, 18 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 365, 376-77 (1989) (emphasis added). 
 34. Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REV. 
481, 494 (1996). 
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will be fully insured by expectation damages.35 What matters to a promisee 
is the expected present value of the damages he will receive in the actual 
world.36 In determining that value, the promisee must discount his expected 
recovery for breach to reflect litigation risks and litigation costs.37 
Litigation risks include the risks of factfinding error by a judge or jury 
and the risk that the promisor may establish a legal defense that prevents the 
promisee from recovering all or part of his losses. Damages based on sur-
plus-enhancing reliance entail high litigation risks because they  
consist in whole or in part of lost profits, which are [always] difficult to measure 
and subject to [various] defenses, such as the principle of Hadley v. Baxendale38 
and the requirement of certainty. Moreover, because lost profits are unliquidated 
[in amount, there is a risk that even if the promisee prevails,] the court may not 
award [him] pre-judgment interest, so that the [present] value of a future recovery 
may also need to be discounted by the time value of money.39 
Given these and other litigation risks, in the case of surplus-enhancing reli-
ance the expected value of actual-world expectation damages is unlikely to 
exceed 70-80% of a promisee’s actual losses.  
Litigation costs include attorney’s fees and the opportunity costs of the 
promisee’s time because the promisee must bear those costs even if he wins. 
Based on casual empiricism, the minimum legal fee for even a relatively 
straightforward commercial breach-of-contract case is often around $10,000 
to $20,000, and the minimum fee for a complex high-value case is likely to 
range from $50,000 to several hundred thousand dollars.40 
The promisee’s litigation risks are a form of co-insurance because they 
require the promisee to bear the difference between his actual damages and 
the expected value of his damages.41 The promisee’s litigation costs are a 
form of deductible because the promisee will have a net recovery only 
above and beyond those costs. “As Cooter points out, deductibles ‘in effect 
divide liability between insured and insurer, giving the insured incentive to 
take more precaution than he would have otherwise.’ The same is true of 
co-insurance.”42 If the expectation measure is viewed as a form of insur-
ance, it is subject to brutal co-insurance and deductibles. Far from being 
fully insured, therefore, a promisee who overrelies is likely to shoot himself 
in the foot. Indeed, given litigation risks and litigation costs, a prudent 
  
 35. Eisenberg & McDonnell, supra note 8, at 1357. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 1357-58. 
 38. Hadley v. Baxendale, (1864) 156 Eng. Rep. 145; 9 Ex. 341. 
 39. Eisenberg & McDonnell, supra note 8, at 1358 (footnote inserted) (footnote 
omitted). 
 40. Id. at 1359. 
 41. Id. at 1359-60. 
 42. Id. at 1358 (footnote omitted) (quoting Cooter, supra note 7, at 39). 
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promisee is more likely to underinvest in surplus-enhancing reliance than to 
overinvest.43 
3. The Extreme Difficulty of Administering the Theory 
Finally, the theory of overreliance would be extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to administer. For most practical purposes, the promisor is the 
only practicable source of information on the probability that she will 
breach any given contract, and the promisee will have little reliable infor-
mation on which to base such a determination.44 For the same reason, it will 
often be difficult, if not impossible, for a court to determine what the promi-
see’s optimal level of reliance was and whether he relied to a greater extent 
than optimal. Moreover, even if the court is able to determine that the prom-
isee had overrelied, and to what extent he had overrelied, the court would 
still “have to determine how much profit the promisee would have made if 
he had optimally relied.”45 
 
* * * 
  
 43. We are indebted to Aaron Edlin for this observation.  
 44. Richard Craswell has proposed an ingenuous rule to solve this problem: the 
promisor would be required to state the probability that he will breach, and the promisee 
would be entitled to base the amount of her reliance on that statement whether or not the 
statement was accurate. See Craswell, supra note 33, at 367-68. Under this rule, the actual 
probability of breach would be irrelevant; only the probability stated by promisor would 
count. Id. This rule, however, would present its own difficulties because even the promisor is 
unlikely to have a good fix on the probability that he will breach any given contract. Cras-
well suggests that this problem can be dealt with by employing a model in which a promisor 
will breach if his cost of performance will exceed the contract price plus the damages he 
would be required to pay if he breached. Id. However, at the time the contract is made a 
promisor will almost never know the amount of the promisee’s damages upon breach. Typi-
cally, a promisee will not disclose to the promisor the amount of profits she expects to make. 
Furthermore, until breach actually occurs, the promisee often will not know how much his 
damages will be because circumstances often change between the time a contract is made 
and the time of breach. The promisor’s costs of performance may also change during that 
time. Finally, Craswell’s model of breach is incomplete because it does not take into account 
that in determining whether to breach the promisor will consider the effect of breach on her 
reputation. This element will also be difficult for either party to quantify, especially because 
the injury to the promisor’s reputation will vary according to the circumstances of the breach, 
the injury caused by the breach, and the publicity given to the breach. The bottom line is that 
even under Craswell’s model of breach, a promisor typically will not know, at the time the 
contract is made, the probability that he will breach. In short, at the time a contract is made, 
the promisor will not know her cost of performance, the damages she will be required to pay 
if she breaches, and whether her cost of performance will exceed the contract price plus those 
damages. Accordingly, a promisor’s statement of that probability will normally be inaccu-
rate. Because the social costs of overreliance (if any) depend on the actual probability of 
breach, not on the promisor’s stated probability of breach, Craswell’s model would not re-
solve the difficulty he addresses. 
 45. Eisenberg & McDonnell, supra note 8, at 1371. 
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In conclusion, the theory of overreliance posits that the “expectation 
measure provides inefficient incentives to a promisee because it insures the 
promisee’s reliance. In the absence of institutional considerations, the theo-
ry could have significant consequences in designing the law of contract 
damages. When institutional considerations are taken into account, howev-
er, the theory has virtually no consequences”:46 (1) In most cases, overreli-
ance normally either cannot or will not occur because, of the way in which 
the “expectation measure is instantiated in specific rules,”47 the actual eco-
nomics of contracting, or both; (2) expectation damages do not in fact insure 
the promisee’s reliance; and (3) in any event, the theory is not administrable 
by either contracting parties or courts. 
B. Adjusting for Enforcement Errors 
Economists have long recognized that without adjustments to conven-
tional remedies, the law will be unable to cause wrongdoers to fully inter-
nalize the costs of their actions because not all victims successfully enforce 
their rights. Some victims do not know they have been wronged.48 Other 
victims know they have been wronged but do not sue.49 Others sue but fail 
to establish their meritorious claims in court or settle for less than the full 
value of their claims.50 
Cooter and Ulen call this the problem of enforcement errors.51 Econ-
omists have long suggested that for remedial regimes to be efficient, they 
must account for the possibility that wrongdoers know they might escape 
some or all liability due to such errors.52  
The general analysis of enforcement errors is commonly applied to 
tort and criminal law.53 Economists’ traditional solution to the problem of 
enforcement errors in tort law is that damages should be increased by a per-
centage that will offset the wrongdoer’s chance of escaping full liability. 
For example, if tortfeasors are caught only 50% of the time, damages should 
  
 46. Id. at 1373-74. 
 47. Id. at 1374. 
 48. See William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and 
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 
636 (1980). 
 49. See id.; Shawn J. Bayern, Explaining the American Norm Against Litigation, 93 
CALIF. L. REV 1697, 1697 (2005). 
 50. Contract plaintiffs have some reasons for settling, or not suing, that tort plaintiffs 
might not share. For example, a contract plaintiff might aim to make up his loss on the con-
tract at issue in future dealings with his contracting partner, may write off an occasional loss 
as a cost of maintaining a relationship with that partner, and so forth. 
 51. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 6, at 396-97. 
 52. See id.  
 53. See, e.g., id. at 393-97 (explaining enforcement errors in tort law); id. at 493-99 
(explaining enforcement errors in criminal law). 
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be doubled;54 if they are caught only 25% of the time, damages should be 
quadrupled.55  
1. Enforcement Errors in Contract Law and the Subjective Beliefs of 
Promisors 
Some law-and-economists have argued in favor of applying an en-
forcement-error analysis to contract law as well. For example, suppose a 
promisor can perform at a cost of $500 and knows that her breach will cost 
the promisee $1,000. Under the expectation measure, if there were no pro-
spect of enforcement errors, the promisor would perform rather than breach 
because she would rather pay $500 to perform than $1,000 to remedy a 
breach. However, if the promisor expects that the probability she will be 
held liable is less than 50%, she would rather breach than perform—at least 
if she is selfish and the breach is not expected to result in other costs, such 
as litigation expenses or reputational damage. The prospect of enforcement 
errors therefore may appear to undermine the efficient incentives provided 
by the expectation measure, unless that probability is factored into damages. 
As this example suggests, although arguments based on enforcement 
errors commonly rest on the probability of enforcement,56 what matters fun-
damentally is the promisor’s subjective beliefs about the probability of en-
forcement. It is these beliefs that motivate the promisor’s perform-or-breach 
and precaution decisions. Subjective probabilities are individual probability 
estimates. If someone says that the probability that the Large Hadron Col-
lider at CERN will destroy Switzerland is 1%, he says little more than that 
he would pay $1 for a chance to win $100 if that happens. He may believe 
his estimate is informed by data or carefully honed intuition, but for a sub-
jective interpretation of probability, it need not be. At bottom, it is a person-
al guess. Ideally, therefore, a remedial regime in contract law that attempted 
to correct for enforcement errors would premise damages in large part on 
the promisor’s state of mind. The central problem in taking enforcement 
errors into account in contract damages is that there is normally no reliable 
way to infer the promisor’s state of mind concerning the probability of en-
forcement. 
  
 54. See, e.g., id. at 397. 
 55. See Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Damages: The Multiplier Principle and 
Its Alternatives, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2185, 2186 (1999).  
 56. E.g., id. at 2186 (referring to “the probability that any given violation will be 
punished”). 
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2. Objective Probabilities and Objective Evidence About Subjective 
Probabilities  
It might seem that a solution to the problem of a court’s inability, in 
the normal case, to determine a promisor’s subjective belief concerning the 
probability of enforcement is to infer that belief on the basis of objective 
probability. This solution, however, would be highly problematic. One 
problem is that the odds are very low that a promisor can accurately predict 
the objective probability of enforcement. A related and even more signifi-
cant problem is that even objective determinations of probability are ex-
tremely elusive in the case of one-off (single, non-repetitive) events.57 To 
see why this is so, it will be helpful to briefly review and analyze several 
different theoretical interpretations of probability.58 
In some settings, probability statements can be understood objectively 
rather than subjectively; that is, they may be taken to be statements about 
the world rather than statements of an actor’s belief about the world.59 These 
kinds of probability statements are commonly presented in the context of 
theoretical games of chance,60 in which probability statements represent 
almost definitional truths. For example, if we define a fair coin to be one for 
which heads and tails are equally likely when flipped, then the objective 
likelihood the coin will show heads after one particular flip is 50%.61 This is 
a statement about the coin and, therefore, about the objective world. Simi-
larly, if we know that 5 of 100 students in a Columbia Law School contracts 
class graduated from Columbia College, we can say the odds of drawing the 
name of a Columbia College graduate at random from the contracts class 
roster is 5%. These statements about probability are just derivations from 
axioms; they are, for the most part, just alternative ways of stating what we 
  
 57. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death and Harm: The Normative Founda-
tions of Risk Regulation, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1293, 1314 (2003) (“Because it is structured 
around general reference classes, general attributes, and relative frequencies, the frequentist 
account [of probability] is unable to attach a probability number to so-called ‘singular’ prop-
ositions absent some restructuring of such propositions in general terms.”). 
 58. For an introduction to the notion of “interpreting” probability—that is, of trying 
to make sense out of the concept—see Alan Hájek, Interpretations of Probability, in STAN. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Fall 2007 ed.), available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2007/entries/probability-interpret. 
 59. As Colin Howson puts it in a helpful summary: “[T]he mathematical theory of 
probability seems to be a syntax with not one but two interpretations, one epistemic and the 
other objective, one relating to our knowledge of the world and the other to the world inde-
pendently of our knowledge.” Colin Howson, Theories of Probability, 46 BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI. 
1, 1 (1995). 
 60. See Hájek, supra note 58. 
 61. See id. 
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already know. Under what is now called classical probability theory, proba-
bilities are little or nothing more than these kind of axiomatic statements.62 
Although objective views of probability are not limited to games of chance 
and similarly well-defined idealized situations, they run into difficulties as 
they move further away from those settings. Under the leading objective 
view of probability, known as frequentism, before estimating the probability 
of an event we need to construct a suitable reference class.63 This prevents 
us from speaking of objective probabilities for one-off scenarios, like 
whether the Large Hadron Collider will destroy Switzerland. Richard von 
Mises, a leading expounder of frequentism, has given the following exam-
ple: “[Frequentist probability] has nothing to do with questions such as: ‘Is 
there a probability of Germany being at some time in the future involved in 
a war with Liberia?’ . . . The implication of Germany in a war with the Re-
public of Liberia is not a situation which frequently repeats itself.”64 
The construction of appropriate reference classes—and the decision 
whether a reference class is appropriate—is a matter of judgment. For ex-
ample, in discussing whether a suitable class of repeating events is available 
in a given type of case, von Mises includes dice and molecular systems, 
excludes a war between Germany and Liberia, and concludes that “the reli-
ability and trustworthiness of witnesses and judges [is] a borderline case 
since we may feel reasonable doubt whether similar situations occur suffi-
ciently frequently and uniformly for them to be considered as repetitive 
phenomena.”65 It is important to recognize that in some cases, as a matter of 
judgment, decision makers may need to admit that relying on specific prob-
ability figures simply isn’t useful. Without an observed pattern or a theoret-
ical justification for a pattern, it becomes difficult either to reach agreement 
on particular probability figures or to put probability figures into practice. 
3. The Elusiveness of Objective Probabilities and Objective Evidence 
About Subjective Probabilities in Contract Cases 
In some areas of law, such as many kinds of accident cases, it may 
well be productive to apply objective probabilities or to use objective evi-
dence to infer subjective beliefs about probabilities. For example, if twice as 
many automobile accidents occur when automobiles are driven at speed X 
than at speed Y, it may make sense to say that the probability of an accident 
is twice as high at speed X than at speed Y—and perhaps it also makes 
sense to infer that certain actors should have beliefs that accord with that 
understanding. However, although a few kinds of breach of contract—such 
  
 62. Cf. id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. RICHARD VON MISES, PROBABILITY, STATISTICS AND TRUTH 9-10 (2d ed. 1981). 
 65. Id. at 10. 
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as a manufacturer’s breach of a consumer warranty as a result of a product 
defect—might sensibly be analyzed by reference to large classes of events, 
in typical contracts cases the construction of a suitable reference class will 
be difficult or impossible. 
For one thing, by the time a promisor enters into an agreement, she 
ordinarily knows the identity of the promisee, the history of the parties’ 
negotiation, and other situation-specific facts. In most cases, there simply is 
no reasonable reference class to use because the individual characteristics of 
the transaction—the nature of the contract, amount, timing, negotiating his-
tory, personal relationships, locale, and so on—will swamp any general 
features of the case and frustrate attempts to generalize. Compare von Mis-
es’s example: Even though wars recur through history, a war between two 
particular countries without a history of war against each other is not the 
sort of repeating event about which we can say, “This event happens in X of 
every Y cases.”66 Accordingly, even if remedies can rest on objective prob-
abilities (or on objective evidence about subjective probabilities) of en-
forcement in some areas of law, that means little for contract law, where 
singular and individualized injuries and enforcement are the norm. 
Moreover, unlike crimes and many torts, breach of contract is typical-
ly a private affair, and as a result, relevant data would be difficult to gather 
in the first place. It may be relatively easy for a governmental agency, or 
even a private organization, to compile statistics about reported but un-
solved crimes and then to compute an enforcement error. Similarly, many 
torts are publicly observed because, for example, the torts are crimes as 
well, or affect many individuals (like toxic torts),67 or occur in public (like 
car accidents), or because insurance companies take notice of and assemble 
actuarial data on the torts. By contrast, breach of contract tends to fly under 
the public radar. If a promisor expects to avoid liability for breach, that is 
probably because she believes that the promisee will not detect the breach, 
will not be able to prove there was a breach, or will not have the resources 
to bring suit. Even if the promisee detects and establishes breach, except in 
small cohesive business communities, it is unlikely that the breach will be 
reported to any agency or private group interested in and capable of compil-
ing accurate statistics. 
  
 66. There are other objective interpretations of probability, see Hájek, supra note 58, 
but they do not change our analysis in any important respect. For instance, there is a view 
known as logical probability, but it does not attempt to address one-off events more than do 
frequentism or classical probability theory. Id. There is also a view known as the propensity 
interpretation, which does aim to make theoretical objective sense of one-off events, but not 
in a way that makes objective probabilities more available for our purposes. (Propensity 
theory was developed to explain the probabilities of one-off events on the quantum-
mechanical level. See id.) 
 67. See Craswell, supra note 55, at 2189. 
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In any event, the details of private contracts and the characteristics of 
contracting partners vary so widely that even if reliable statistics could be 
gathered concerning the likelihood of underenforcement of contracts as a 
whole, particular classes of contracts, or contracts made by a particular 
promisor, that data would be virtually unusable as applied to any given con-
tract. 
If there are no sensible ways to reach social or theoretical agreement 
about probabilities of enforcement in individual contracts cases, it is even 
less plausible to imagine that we can reliably infer an individual promisor’s 
subjective beliefs about enforcement. Such an inference would not just be a 
guess; it would be a guess at a guess. To put this differently, even if there 
were a sensible objective probability to which the promisor should have 
personally subscribed, the existence of this probability does not imply that 
the promisor was able to discern it. Nor would it imply that a court, in set-
ting damages, would be able to expect that the promisor would predict the 
court’s level of damages, which would of course be necessary for remedies 
to affect the promisor’s behavior. 
4. Other Administrative Concerns in Enhancing Contract Damages by 
Adjusting for Enforcement Errors 
As a result of these factors, estimates of the probability of enforcement 
errors in contract law are likely to be both highly speculative and highly 
inaccurate.68 Richard Craswell, who is generally supportive of the recent 
work in remedial theory in contract law, nevertheless develops a penetrating 
litany of further, related administrative problems that would be raised by 
enforcement-error regimes: 
As a result [of the administrative costs of an enforcement-error regime based 
on subjective estimates of probability,] recent economic analyses have . . . consid-
ered the use of multipliers that are the same for all defendants, rather than being 
figured separately on a case-by-case basis. Interestingly, if a constant multiplier is 
used, the most efficient multiplier will generally be less than the traditional multi-
plier would suggest, meaning that it will be less than one over the probability of 
punishment faced by the average wrongdoer. In some cases, the optimal multiplier 
could even be less than one, meaning that damages should be reduced (rather than 
augmented) in order to create efficient incentives in the presence of imperfect en-
forcement.69 
  
 68. Cf. Omri Ben-Shahar & Lisa Bernstein, The Secrecy Interest in Contract Law, 
109 YALE L.J. 1885, 1896 (2000) (“Unlike in the tort context . . . where actuarial tables make 
the award of a meaningful average measure of damages feasible, using an ‘average expecta-
tion’ measure in the contracts context would require courts to make factual determinations . . 
. that in most cases they are ill-equipped to make.”). 
 69. Craswell, supra note 5, at 1168-69 (emphasis added). 
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Unfortunately (but perhaps realistically), these analyses also suggest that the 
exact size of the efficient multiplier will depend on a number of factors that are 
likely to be hard to measure.70 
In short, the analysis of efficient remedies is complicated enough even if we 
consider only two sets of consequences: (a) the deterrent effect on wrongdoers, to-
gether with (b) the effect on total enforcement costs. That is, even if we limit our 
attention to these two effects alone, the most efficient measure of damages could 
be either higher or lower than an exactly compensatory measure.71 
In short, even if an economic understanding of enforcement errors is 
applicable in tort law or criminal law, achieving a coherent enforcement-
error remedial regime in contract law is probably impossible, and such a 
regime would certainly be unadministrable.72 
C. Taking into Account the Secrecy Interest 
In The Secrecy Interest in Contract Law, Omri Ben-Shahar and Lisa 
Bernstein identified and developed what they called the “secrecy interest” in 
contract law—that is, the interest of a promisee in not being required to 
reveal secret information as a condition to recovering damages in a suit for 
breach of contract.73 For example, a promisee who wishes to establish a 
claim for lost profits may not want to reveal secret information about his 
suppliers or his costs. The central point of the article is that the rules of con-
tract law and civil procedure fail to take the secrecy interest into account.74 
As a result, contract damages tend to be undercompensatory because the 
law’s failure to protect the secrecy interest may cause a promisee to forgo 
all or part of his claim.75 Undercompensatory damages, in turn, will fail to 
provide incentives for the goals of achieving efficient performance, precau-
tion, and surplus-enhancing reliance.76 Ben-Shahar and Bernstein do not call 
into question those goals, the expectation measure, or the indifference prin-
ciple. Rather, their aim is to bolster those goals, and bring the expectation 
measure into closer conformity with the indifference principle, by better 
  
 70. Id. at 1169. 
 71. Id. at 1170-71. 
 72. Moreover, contracting parties—unlike the parties in a typical tort case—have 
some opportunity to minimize in advance the importance of potential enforcement errors. If, 
for example, the danger is that breach will be unnoticed, the contract can call for an ongoing 
exchange of information among the parties. If the danger is that breach will not be verifiable 
to a court, the contract can include a definition of breach that courts can easily apply in a way 
that the parties can reliably predict. As a result, there may be reasons to believe that en-
forcement errors in contract law will be systematically less significant than in other areas of 
law. 
 73. See Ben-Shahar & Bernstein, supra note 68, at 1888. 
 74. Id. at 1889-90. 
 75. Id. at 1890-91. 
 76. Id. at 1893. 
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assuring that secrecy-sensitive promisees are indifferent between perfor-
mance, on the one hand, and breach and damages, on the other.77 Accord-
ingly, they write “[w]ith a view toward refining, rather than challenging, the 
well-established literature on the economics of contract damages.”78 
The Secrecy Interest points to a real-life problem. However, Ben-
Shahar and Bernstein fail to balance the costs of that problem against the 
costs of the solutions they propose. 
To begin with, Ben-Shahar and Bernstein overweigh the secrecy inter-
est. Observation suggests that promisees regularly sue for lost profits with-
out a substantial concern about the information they must disclose by doing 
so. There are a number of reasons why this is so. Many types of damages 
depend on formulas whose elements are not secret, such as the difference 
between contract price and market price or the difference between the mar-
ket value of a promised performance and the market value of the perfor-
mance actually rendered. Next, under the principle of Hadley v. Baxendale79 
promisees must often disclose at the time a contract is made that if breach 
occurs they will incur lost profits of a certain type, thereby diminishing up-
front the amount of information they would otherwise prefer to keep secret. 
Furthermore, some kinds of secret information can be shielded in litigation 
by a protective order. For example, in In re Gabapentin Patent Litigation, a 
patent-law suit, the court upheld a protective order that allowed a party to 
redact a supplier’s identity, among other secrets.80 Similarly, in CSU Hold-
ings v. Xerox, the court held that the defendant had not demonstrated that it 
needed to know the identities of twelve confidential suppliers.81 Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, most secrets have a very short shelf-life, while 
litigation is interminable. Accordingly, even if there is secret information 
bearing on a contract, which has some value when the contract is made, the 
information is likely to have lost most or all of that value before litigation 
proceeds very far.  
Just as Ben-Shahar and Bernstein overweigh the costs of the secrecy 
interest, they underweigh the costs of abolishing or drastically changing the 
doctrines they believe undermine that interest. Ben-Shahar and Bernstein 
critique a variety of remedial doctrines through the lens of the secrecy inter-
est.82 Their critiques of cover and mitigation are paradigmatic. As to cover, 
they say: 
In cases in which an aggrieved buyer has in fact covered, proving that she did so in 
an appropriate manner requires her to reveal a great deal of private information. 
  
 77. Id. at 1897-1901. 
 78. Id. at 1924. 
 79. Hadley v. Baxendale, (1864) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 150; 9 Ex. 341, 353. 
 80. 312 F. Supp. 2d 653, 669 (D.N.J. 2004). 
 81. 162 F.R.D. 355, 358 (D. Kan. 1995). 
 82. See Ben-Shahar & Bernstein, supra note 68. 
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Establishing whether cover has taken place necessitates an inquiry into many of the 
transactions that the aggrieved party entered into immediately following breach. It 
may also require her to reveal sensitive business or market information, the identity 
of the next lowest cost supplier and the price at which he is willing to sell, as well 
as the identity and price charged by a large number of other market participants.83 
As to mitigation, they say: “A defendant attempting to establish that a 
plaintiff failed to mitigate her damages is permitted to take broad discovery 
of numerous documents and information that plaintiffs often have a substan-
tial interest in keeping private.”84 However, the costs of abolishing or drasti-
cally cutting back the doctrines of cover and mitigation would be very high. 
The duty to mitigate reduces social losses and, thereby, increases social 
welfare. Moreover, that duty is based not only on sound policy but also on 
morality. If the promisee can reduce damages at little or no cost to himself, 
he is morally obliged to do so. Similarly, cover is a central remedy in con-
tract law because it serves as a kind of virtual specific performance.85 As a 
remedy, cover has the look and feel of damages because the buyer ends up 
with a money judgment. As an act, however, cover yields many of the bene-
fits of specific performance.86 By covering, the buyer finds a replacement 
performance that, when put together with cover damages, is equivalent to 
what the buyer would have received if the seller had been ordered to specif-
ically perform. Where cover can be achieved, it presents four substantial 
advantages over both market-price damages and actual specific perfor-
mance.  
First, because the buyer chooses the replacement performance himself, 
cover reflects the buyer’s subjective preferences. Therefore, cover avoids 
the shortfalls that often result when the buyer’s damages depend on a con-
structed market price that does not take the buyer’s subjective preferences 
into account. Second, in the case of a differentiated commodity, cover dam-
ages are often much easier to prove than market-price damages. In such 
cases, to prove market-price damages the buyer needs to locate and then 
extrapolate information from comparable transactions—a process the seller 
will inevitably contest. In contrast, if the buyer covers he may need to show 
only the cover price. Third, the act of cover normally prevents or minimizes 
the private and social costs of consequential losses. If a seller breaches a 
contract to supply an input or a factor of production, timely cover will pre-
vent or minimize the buyer’s loss of profits as a result of the breach. Corre-
  
 83. Id. at 1912 (footnote omitted). 
 84. Id. at 1913. 
 85. For further discussion of cover, see Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1041-49. 
 86. Cf. Timothy J. Muris, The Costs of Freely Granting Specific Performance, 1982 
DUKE L.J. 1053, 1055-56 (1982) (referring to “specific performance of [a] contract through 
the market”); Subha Narasimhan, Modification: The Self-Help Specific Performance Reme-
dy, 97 YALE L.J. 61 (1987) (using the phrase “self-help specific performance,” although in a 
different context). 
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spondingly, timely cover will prevent or minimize the private cost to the 
buyer that results from the operation of the principle of Hadley v. Baxen-
dale.87 Finally, actual specific performance often involves problems con-
cerning the enforcement process, mitigation, and the right to a jury trial.88 
Cover does not present these problems. 
In contrast to the benefits of the principles of cover and mitigation, 
which are very high, the benefits of implementing the secrecy interest 
would be extremely low. For example, it is not clear why 
[e]stablishing whether cover has taken place . . . may . . . require [an aggrieved 
buyer] to reveal sensitive business or market information, the identity of the next 
lowest cost supplier and the price at which he is willing to sell, as well as the iden-
tity and price charged by a large number of market participants.89  
As a practical matter, normally a buyer will put into evidence a pur-
chase that he claims is cover, and the seller will then have the burden of 
coming forward with evidence showing either that the purchase was not 
really a replacement for the breached commodity or that the buyer overpaid. 
Furthermore, most of the information described by Ben-Shahar and Bern-
stein in connection with cover is not secret in any event. For example, it is 
highly unlikely that “the identity and price charged by a large number of 
other market participants” will be known only to the buyer.90 Similarly, it is 
doubtful that a seller who wants to show that a plaintiff failed to mitigate 
damages has a broad right to discover secret documents and information. 
For example, the issue of mitigation arises most commonly in employment 
cases, and it is highly unlikely that a wrongfully discharged employee will 
have a trove of valuable relevant secret documents and information relating 
to his attempts to mitigate. Much the same will be true in other types of 
mitigation cases. Of course, there may be instances where a plaintiff will be 
required to reveal secret information in mitigation or cover cases—although 
even that is made unlikely by the short shelf life of secret information—but 
these instances will not be thick on the ground. 
In short, the problem with the remedial regime proposed in The Secre-
cy Interest is not lack of administrability, but lack of soundness: the pro-
posed regime would throw out the baby with the bathwater. Like the baby, 
the remedial doctrines that Ben-Shahar and Bernstein would eliminate or 
cut back are extremely valuable. Like the bathwater, in the typical case the 
secrecy interest has little or no value. 
  
 87. Hadley v. Baxendale, (1864) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 150; 9 Ex. 341, 353. 
 88. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1019-22. 
 89. Ben-Shahar & Bernstein, supra note 68, at 1912 (emphasis added) (footnote 
omitted). 
 90. Id. at 1912. 
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III. CRITIQUES OF THE EXPECTATION MEASURE THAT REST ON 
ALTERNATIVE GOALS FOR REMEDIAL REGIMES IN CONTRACT LAW 
Part II discussed remedial regimes that shared the efficiency goals of 
the indifference principle and the expectation measure—efficient rates of 
performance and precautions, and facilitation of surplus-enhancing reli-
ance—but entailed modifications of that measure to better satisfy the prin-
ciple. In contrast, some law-and-economists have argued that remedial re-
gimes should serve other goals entirely. In this Part, we consider several of 
these proposed regimes. 
A. Remedial Regimes Whose Goal Is to Promote Efficient Search for Con-
tracting Counterparties 
One possible alternative goal for remedial regimes in contract law is to 
promote efficient search for contracting counterparties. Search entails costs, 
but if successful can be rewarding. In particular, the joint surplus produced 
by one pair of contracting parties may be larger than the joint surplus pro-
duced by another, and a party who wants to contract may need to search to 
locate the counterparty who will generate the highest joint surplus. 
Peter Diamond and Eric Maskin have modeled the effects of remedial 
regimes on incentives to conduct efficient searches for contracting part-
ners.91 Diamond and Maskin emphasize that an actor’s decision to search 
for a contracting counterparty affects other searchers because that decision 
can influence the matches that other searchers can make.92 For example, if 
an actor decides to search for a condominium in Boca Raton, he gives pro-
spective sellers in Boca a new opportunity to be matched with a buyer. 
More generally, a decision to search can either help or hurt other searchers. 
New high-quality searchers typically benefit potential counterparties. How-
ever, new low-quality searchers can have either positive or negative ef-
fects.93 To simplify somewhat, new low-quality searchers can help existing 
searchers by making it easier for them to find someone, but can harm exist-
ing searchers by reducing the average quality of potential matches. Given a 
pre-set fixed expenditure on search, an existing searcher’s best result is like-
ly to be lower if the average quality of potential matches is reduced by the 
entrance of new low-quality searchers. 
  
 91. See generally Peter A. Diamond & Eric Maskin, An Equilibrium Analysis of 
Search and Breach of Contract, I: Steady States, 10 BELL J. ECON. 282 (1979) [hereinafter 
Diamond & Maskin I]; P.A. Diamond & Eric Maskin, An Equilibrium Analysis of Search 
and Breach of Contract II. A Non-Steady State Example, 25 J. ECON. THEORY 165 (1981). 
 92. Diamond & Maskin I, supra note 91, at 283-86. 
 93. See id. at 283-84. 
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Accordingly, one of Diamond and Maskin’s central concerns is the 
positive or negative externalities that result from an actor’s decision to 
search for contracting counterparties.94 They argue that a remedial regime 
can give actors incentives either to search or not because the regime can 
affect both the value of contracts that may result from search (thereby mak-
ing search potentially more or less valuable) and the cost of breaching an 
existing contract to make a new one.95 That cost matters to Diamond and 
Maskin because in their model, even after an actor has entered into a con-
tract she can and often will continue to search for a better counterparty.96  
This theory, however, does not easily translate into practice. As Dia-
mond and Maskin point out: 
[H]igher damages induce opposing effects on the incentives for . . . search . . . 
sometimes making comparisons with compensatory [that is, expectation] damages 
difficult. On the one hand, search is encouraged (relative to compensatory damag-
es) by the greater return higher damages yield when breach [of the new contract] 
occurs. On the other hand, search is discouraged by the higher damages set [for 
breach under the old contract], which diminish opportunities for breach.97 
In other words, while it is conceivable that a remedial regime that is 
based on search, rather than on the indifference principle and the expecta-
tion measure, might provide a level of damages that provides better incen-
tives for efficient search activity, Diamond and Maskin do not articulate 
such a regime. Indeed, as Craswell has pointed out, “[I]t is difficult to say 
whether the optimal measure of damages [for this purpose] would be either 
higher or lower than the expectation measure, for this may depend on the 
exact structure of the costs and potential returns to search.”98 Furthermore, 
even if an alternative remedial regime were successful at optimizing search 
activity, the regime would be likely to promote inefficient perform-or-
breach decisions. As Diamond and Maskin state, “Damage rules affect both 
search and breach decisions. Only by happy coincidence could a single in-
strument induce the right decisions in both categories.”99 It is therefore not 
surprising that Diamond and Maskin conclude that no single formula for 
damages promotes efficient incentives for both breach and search.100 If any-
  
 94. See id. 
 95. See id. at 284-85. 
 96. Cf. Craswell, supra note 5, at 1164-65; Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, 
and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REV. 481, 500 (1996); Richard Craswell, supra note 1, at 
649 n.43. 
 97. Diamond & Maskin I, supra note 91, at 284. 
 98. Craswell, supra note 5, at 1165. For Craswell’s discussion of search externali-
ties, which differs somewhat from that of Diamond and Maskin, see id. at 1164-65. 
 99. Diamond & Maskin I, supra note 91, at 299. 
 100. See id. 
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thing, they suggest, under some conditions “compensatory” (expectation) 
damages are probably more efficient than higher measures.101  
Diamond and Maskin’s argument suffers from another problem. The 
argument implicitly builds on the theory of efficient breach because one of 
Diamond and Maskin’s major concerns is to allow parties who have already 
contracted to fluidly continue to search for better counterparties. For exam-
ple, in describing a case of two original pairs of contracting parties in which 
one party in each pair breaches and the two breaching parties make a new 
contract with each other, Diamond and Maskin state that with compensatory 
(that, is expectation) damages, “the incentives for two breaching parties 
coincide with efficiency for all four original partners . . . . That is, the two 
[breaching] individuals find it in their interest to breach precisely when by 
so doing they increase the sum of the expected payoffs of these four part-
ners.”102 
In practice, however, a breach by a promisor—as opposed to a mutual-
ly agreed-upon termination—almost never increases the payoff to the prom-
isee as compared to the payoff from the performance, and on the contrary 
almost always decreases that payoff. To begin with, a promisor considering 
breach typically won’t know whether her gain from breach will exceed her 
promisee’s loss, and therefore is not in a position to determine the relative 
joint surplus from breach and performance.103 More important, expectation 
damages never make promisees indifferent between breach and perfor-
mance because, among other things, such damages—and most other types 
of damages—generally (1) rest on objective rather than subjective criteria; 
(2) are unavailable unless reasonably foreseeable at the time the contract is 
made and fairly certain at the time the contract is breached; (3) entail the 
loss of the time value of money; and (4) can be recovered only by incurring 
high legal fees that normally will not be included in the damage award.104 
Indeed, the theory of efficient breach is actually inefficient. One met-
ric for measuring the efficiency of a contract rule is to ask what rule well-
informed bargaining parties would agree upon if they were bargaining cost-
free. The theory of efficient breach fails to satisfy this metric, and applica-
tion of the theory would normally violate the implied terms of the parties’ 
contracts. For example:  
  
 101. See id. at 293. For purposes of discussion, Diamond and Maskin do at times 
provide formulas for these measures, but in the end, these formulas do not amount to specific 
alternative proposals. See id. at 288-92. Craswell has also proposed that the possibility of 
more general precontractual incentives ought to influence the damages awarded for breach of 
contract. Richard Craswell, Precontractual Investigation as an Optimal Precaution Problem, 
17 J. LEGAL STUD. 401, 402 (1988). For similar reasons, however, the proposal would be 
almost impossible to apply, as Craswell recognizes. See id. at 426. 
 102. Diamond & Maskin I, supra note 91, at 284. 
 103. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 998, 1000. 
 104. See id. at 989-97. 
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Suppose that Seller and Buyer have negotiated a contract under which Seller agrees 
to sell a differentiated commodity to Buyer—say a home to live in, custom-made 
widgets that Buyer will use as an input in production, or a used die press that Buy-
er will employ as a factor of production. As the parties are about to sign a written 
contract, Seller says to Buyer, “In all honesty, I should tell you that although I have 
no present intention to breach this contract, neither do I have a present intention to 
perform. If a better offer comes along, I will take it and pay you expectation dam-
ages. In fact, I will begin actively looking for a better offer right after we sign this 
contract. Let’s insert a provision that recognizes I will do just that.” What would be 
Buyer’s likely response? Under the theory of efficient breach, Buyer would say, 
“Of course, I expect no more.” Experience strongly suggests, however, that in real 
life, most buyers would be surprised if not shocked by such a statement and would 
either walk away; insist on an explicit contractual provision stating that the seller 
has a present intent to perform and that any profit on breach and resale will go to 
buyer; or demand a payment, in the form of a lower price, for the seller’s right to 
resell.105 
Accordingly, if it is assumed that contracts between well-informed 
parties are efficient, that a contract includes implied as well as express 
terms, and that well-informed parties would have refused to permit each 
other to search for overbidders unless a premium was paid for the right to 
do so, then it is implied in nearly every contract that the seller will not con-
tinue to search unless the contract explicitly authorizes her to do so. Conse-
quently, the theory of efficient breach inefficiently remakes the parties’ con-
tract. (Why then don’t contracts explicitly provide that the promisor can’t 
continue searching for a new contract partner? For the same reason that 
parents don’t tell babysitters not to have sex with the children. The point is 
so obvious that no one would think of explicitly addressing it.) 
B. Remedial Regimes Whose Goal Is to Eliminate Adverse Selection and 
Other Effects of Inefficient Pricing 
A well-known issue in tort law is the problem of activity levels. Simp-
ly put, if an activity forces others to incur some cost, such as physical inju-
ries, then the activity can occur more often than is efficient even if it is con-
ducted carefully. As Steven Shavell puts it, even an injurer who must pay 
damages when he acts negligently may “not be motivated to consider the 
effect on accident[al] losses of his choice of whether to engage in his activi-
ty or, more generally, of the level at which to engage in his activity.”106 Sim-
ilarly, from society’s perspective, victims who are fully compensated for 
  
 105. Id. at 1006-07. 
 106. Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (1980) 
(emphasis omitted). 
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injuries that result from their own activity may engage in the activity too 
often.107 
This analysis of activity levels in tort law doesn’t carry over to con-
tract law directly. It would make little or no sense to say there are too many 
contracts.108 However, the analysis related to activity levels has suggested to 
some that in a contractual setting the expectation measure can give rise to 
two related problems, known as cross-subsidization and adverse selection.109 
As Craswell notes: 
[I]n many contexts users differ [from one another] in the expected damages that a . 
. . breach would inflict. For example, if a defective toaster [that is, under warranty] 
causes a fire, the consequential damages will be greater for users with expensive 
homes and furnishings than they will be for users with modest, working class 
homes.110 
However, the argument goes, a manufacturer will normally charge all 
customers the same price—a price that impounds the average damages he 
will be obliged to pay.111 This in turn will lead to two problems. First, cus-
tomers for whom the expected loss is low (for example, those with modest 
homes) will be subsidizing customers for whom the expected loss is high 
(for example, those with expensive homes).112 This is the problem known as 
cross-subsidization. Second, because of cross-subsidization the price to low-
expected-loss customers will be higher than it would be if no customers 
carried a high-expected risk.113 As a result, these customers may be ineffi-
ciently discouraged from purchasing the good or service. This is the prob-
lem known as adverse selection.114 Cross-subsidization by itself only trans-
fers wealth; it does not cause a net social loss. However, a net social loss 
does arise when cross-subsidization leads to adverse selection.115 In short, as 
with other activity-level arguments, the concern is that some actors will 
  
 107. See Craswell, supra note 5, at 1157; Shavell, supra note 106, at 17-20. Of 
course, in cases of physical injuries—and in other situations where compensation is imper-
fect—victims tend to have very strong incentives anyway to avoid being injured. 
 108. When contracts harm third parties, it can make sense to say there are too many 
of them. But such contracts normally ought to be either prohibited (like contracts to commit a 
crime) or addressed by tort law (like contracts to engage in an activity that increases the risk 
of accidents for third-party victims). 
 109. See Craswell, supra note 5, at 1158-59.  
 110. Id. at 1158. 
 111. Id. at 1159. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. As Craswell notes, cross-subsidization is still problematic because it is likely to 
be unfair, particularly because it tends to transfer wealth from richer promisees to poorer 
promisees. Id. at 1159. However, this unfairness—to the extent it exists—needs to be com-
pared against the unfairness of remedial regimes that do not adhere to the indifference prin-
ciple. 
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choose inefficient levels of some contractual activities (like purchasing 
toasters) because the injuries that result from those activities are subsidized 
by others (those with less to lose if the toaster burns down their house). 
Craswell puts it as follows:  
[F]rom the standpoint of efficient activity levels, the subsidy could produce “ad-
verse selection,” meaning that riskier customers (those who benefit from the subsi-
dy) will use the product excessively, while less risky customers (those who have to 
pay the subsidy) will use it too little. In the extreme case, the less risky customers 
might even be priced out of the market entirely, leaving only the highest-risk cus-
tomers to purchase the product.116 
As in the case of other critiques of the expectation measure, these 
problems are unlikely to occur in practice, and even if they were likely to 
occur, no workable alternative to expectation damages would cure the prob-
lems. 
1. Contractual Mechanisms to Avoid Cross-Subsidization and Adverse 
Selection 
Cross-subsidization and adverse selection arise when sellers cannot 
differentiate among buyers—that is, when they cannot charge each buyer a 
price that corresponds to that buyer’s expected compensable loss.117 Howev-
er, both contract doctrine and common business arrangements let sellers 
differentiate among buyers at little cost. For example, the principle of Had-
ley v. Baxendale allows a promisee to recover only those damages that were 
reasonably foreseeable to the promisor in advance.118 Because of the Hadley 
principle, either a seller will not be liable for a buyer’s abnormally high loss 
from breach, or the seller will have information about the prospective loss, 
in which case the seller can increase the price accordingly, decline to deal 
with the buyer, or contractually limit the buyer’s damages. It is therefore 
likely that “all users of the good or service are identical”119—or at least sub-
stantially similar—with respect to the amount of damages the seller will 
expect to pay in the event of a loss. Moreover, sellers can, at small cost, 
either limit their own liability for consequential damages or provide a menu 
of liability options and linked prices from which buyers can select the level 
of liability they desire.120 Thus, a shipping company might allow buyers to 
purchase different levels of “insurance” for packages, and each buyer can 
select a level that corresponds to the loss he expects. 
  
 116. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 117. See id. at 1158-59. 
 118. Hadley v. Baxendale, (1864) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 147-48; 9 Ex. 341, 345-46. 
 119. Craswell, supra note 5, at 1158. 
 120. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Principle of Hadley v. Baxendale, 80 CALIF. L. 
REV. 563, 606-08 (1992). 
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2. Implications for the Indifference Principle and the Expectation 
Measure 
Even if cross-subsidization were likely to pose a problem, it is unclear 
what to do about it. Craswell proposes no alternative to expectation damag-
es to address the problem, and it is unlikely that a workable alternative is 
available. This is not surprising, because adverse selection does not result 
from the expectation measure. Rather, it occurs whenever courts compen-
sate individual buyers at different levels in cases where sellers cannot dis-
criminate among customers by predicting these levels and pricing accord-
ingly. 
One candidate for responding to the problems of cross-subsidization 
and adverse selection would be to award any given injured promisee only 
the level of damages suffered by all of the promisor’s injured promisees.121 
We will call this the least-common-denominator measure. This measure is 
highly problematic. First, if least-common-denominator damages are noth-
ing or next to nothing because some promisees were almost entirely unin-
jured by the breach, courts would award nothing or next to nothing to those 
promisees—perhaps the great majority—who were injured. Second, a court 
that wanted to impose least-common-denominator damages would need to 
determine those damages by surveying the entire class of injured promi-
sees—and do so whenever a new case arose, since the population of injured 
promisees will fluctuate over time. Courts are completely unequipped to 
make such determinations. 
There is a broader problem with attempts to respond to adverse selec-
tion by proposing an alternative remedy for breach. Adverse selection can 
be interpreted as merely a cost that arises from the seller’s lack of infor-
mation about individual buyers. Changing the remedy for breach does not 
eliminate this cost; it merely pretends to avoid the cost by shifting it else-
where—for example, by leading a buyer who wants compensation for 
breach to obtain first-party insurance, in which case the adverse-selection 
problem will resurface between the buyer and his insurer. 
  
 121. This solution is tentatively proposed by Gwyn D. Quillen, Note, Contract Dam-
ages and Cross-Subsidization, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1140-41 (1988) (“To avoid [cross-
subsidization], buyers should be allowed to recover only those damages that all buyers, either 
high or low risk, will suffer due to the seller’s breach. Where this principle conflicts with 
other goals of remedies for breach of contract, such as inducing the seller to take the optimal 
precautions against breach, the problem of cross-subsidization should be weighed against the 
problems recovery is intended to address, and the appropriate remedy chosen on a case-by-
case basis. Tests such as ‘foreseeability,’ ‘tacit agreement,’ and the ‘necessity of preventing 
injustice’ may allow courts to do just that.”). 
30 Michigan State Law Review Vol. 2013:1 
C. Efficient Mitigation After Breach 
Law-and-economics scholars have long noted what Robert Cooter has 
called the “paradox of compensation”: when a wrongdoer internalizes the 
full cost of her wrongs, her victims may have diminished incentives or even 
no incentives to take precaution against these wrongs.122 Applying this idea 
in a contractual setting, Craswell suggests that under a remedial regime that 
implements the indifference principle, a promisee may “run up . . . damages 
needlessly by continuing to perform after the other party has already an-
nounced its breach.”123  
However, such a failure to mitigate is extremely unlikely. Even under 
a regime that implements the indifference principle perfectly and thereby 
causes promisees to be completely indifferent between performance and 
breach, a promisee has no incentive to “run up . . . damages needlessly”124 
for their own sake, simply to be reimbursed for them later. Unless the prom-
isee is irrationally spiteful, the only reason he might wish to avoid mitigat-
ing his damages is that mitigation may carry some cost. Often, however, 
mitigation has no cost. For instance, in Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge 
Co., a bridge company entered into an agreement with a county to build a 
bridge. 125 The county later decided that it did not want the bridge, instructed 
the bridge company not to proceed any further with the bridge, and canceled 
construction of a road that was to lead to the bridge.126 Because the county 
did not want the bridge, and the bridge was useless without the road, further 
construction of the bridge represented a pure social loss. Moreover, this loss 
was not reduced by any significant private gain to the bridge company that 
would result from the continuation of construction. The company would 
have been just as well off if it stopped work and sued for damages as it 
would have been if it finished the bridge and was awarded the full contract 
price.127  
Even when mitigation does have a cost, the cost is likely to be low be-
cause contract law does not require parties to undertake mitigation when it 
is unduly costly or risky.128 Moreover, because compensation for harm is 
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never certain, and even expectation damages normally do not fully satisfy 
the indifference principle,129 in the real world promisees have little incentive 
to run up damages needlessly by incurring costs, since they would run a 
significant risk that they would not recover some or even any of the costs. 
Furthermore, it is a basic principle of contract law that a promisee who 
does not take reasonable steps to mitigate will be unable to recover the loss-
es that result from his failure to mitigate.130 Therefore, promisees who do 
not mitigate when it is inexpensive and not risky to do so will lose some or 
even all of their damages. 
Craswell argues, however, that the doctrine of mitigation may be inef-
ficient because it involves: 
Extra administrative costs, by requiring courts to evaluate the victim’s behavior. 
[It] may also introduce additional uncertainty, and additional risk of judicial error, 
by leaving it to courts to decide what kind of behavior is “reasonable.” For these 
reasons, it may sometimes be easier to influence victims’ incentives by reducing 
the damages paid to all victims. 131 
Accordingly, Craswell suggests that it might be more efficient to re-
move the duty to mitigate and instead to lower the promisees’ damages sys-
tematically in order to recapture the efficient incentives of the duty to miti-
gate.132 
However, Craswell does no more than raise the possibility that a sys-
tematic reduction in damages would be less costly than a determination 
about a party’s failure to mitigate. He gives no reason to suppose this would 
actually be the case, and it is highly unlikely that it would be. What would 
such a reduction look like? Would there be one standard reduction for all 
plaintiffs or varying reductions depending on the type of claim? Would the 
reduction be reassessed annually? And how would such a reduction be ac-
complished? If a reduction were to be accomplished judicially, would the 
reduction in one case be the rule for all cases in the same jurisdiction, or 
would the courts need to determine the reduction case by case? If the reduc-
tion were to be accomplished case by case, it would certainly be much more 
costly than a determination of whether the plaintiff had exercised reasonable 
efforts to mitigate. If the reduction for all cases were to be accomplished in 
one fell swoop, it would require a kind of inquiry for which courts are ill 
suited.  
  
the promisee is “required to incur ‘only slight expense and reasonable effort’ in mitigating 
his damages”). 
 129. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 989-97 (explaining the shortfall between expec-
tation damages and the indifference principle as a result of the way damages are computed in 
practice, rules that foreclose uncertain and unforeseeable damages, and other factors).  
 130. See generally Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: 
Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligations, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 967-69 (1983). 
 131. Craswell, supra note 5, at 1154. 
 132. Id. at 1153-54. 
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Courts are accustomed to and capable of making retail determinations 
of reasonableness and fault, and a judgment about mitigation is no harder to 
reach than any other judgment a court makes about these issues. In contrast, 
courts are unaccustomed to and incapable of making the sort of wholesale 
determinations Craswell seems to suggest. Such a reduction could be ac-
complished by statute, but the legislature would then be entering an arena 
that, generally speaking, has been regarded as better suited to the courts. In 
either event, consider the massive amount of forum shopping that would 
follow if some states went Craswell’s route and others did not, or if all 
states went Craswell’s route but adopted different reductions. Of course, 
that problem could be avoided by a federal statute, but the prospect of con-
gressional action on an issue like this is not too appealing. 
Furthermore, Craswell’s argument about adverse selection is incon-
sistent with his conclusion here. Craswell argues that a systematic reduction 
in the damages available to promisees would serve as a kind of “strict liabil-
ity on [promisees], making [them] bear the loss whether or not they have 
behaved reasonably.”133 Because of adverse selection, however, this sort of 
strict liability would be inefficient: if damages for all promisees are system-
ically reduced, promisees who took reasonable steps to mitigate damages 
would subsidize those who didn’t. As a result, many or most promisees 
could be discouraged from mitigating, leading to increasingly inefficient 
levels of mitigation. 
D. A Remedial Regime Based on Expected-Wealth Effects 
Still another alternative model, also proposed by Craswell, is based on 
the premise that efficient precaution is achieved only when the promisor 
takes into account the subjective value that the promisee places on incre-
mental increases in precaution by the promisor, and the consequent decreas-
es in the risk of breach: 
Insofar as we are concerned with the wrongdoer’s incentive to take precautions, the 
efficient level of damages cannot necessarily be derived from the value that victims 
place on the entire loss they would suffer, as if they were being asked to accept that 
loss with certainty. Instead, the efficient level of damages should be determined by 
first finding the value that victims place on the specific reduction in risk that is un-
der consideration—since this is all the difference those precautions will actually 
make to the victims—and then working backwards from that value to come up with 
the damage measure that gives the manufacturer the correct incentives.134 
We will call this the expected-wealth model. 
  
 133. Id. at 1154. 
 134. Id. at 1162.  
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To make the argument more concrete, consider the following example, 
which is based in part on an example that Craswell formulated.135 Suppose 
that a manufacturer produces machines, and every buyer expects to suffer a 
$10,000 loss if the manufacturer fails to deliver the machine. If a buyer is 
rational and risk neutral, he will value all 1% reductions in the risk of deliv-
ery failure—say, from 25% to 24% or from 2% to 1%—at $100 (1% of 
$10,000). However, Craswell observes, if a buyer experiences diminishing 
marginal utility of wealth and therefore risk aversion,136 a decline in the risk 
of breach from 25% to 24% should be more valuable to him than a decline 
from 2% to 1%, because he will have greater expected wealth from the con-
tract when he faces only a 2% risk of breach (and therefore a 98% likeli-
hood of performance) than when he faces a 25% risk of breach (and there-
fore only a 75% likelihood of performance). While a risk neutral buyer 
would value all these reductions in risk at $100, a risk-averse buyer might 
value some of them differently. 
So, for example, imagine that because of diminishing marginal utility, 
a buyer values a reduction in risk from 25% to 24% at $105 instead of $100. 
Then following Craswell’s argument, if the aim of expectation damages is 
to give the promisor efficient incentives to take precaution, damages for 
breach should be $10,500, rather than the $10,000 that expectation damages 
would provide. The reason is that if damages were set at $10,500, the manu-
facturer would have the proper incentive to spend $105 on a given precau-
tion: investment in the precaution has an expected payoff to the manufactur-
er of $105 because it reduces by 1% the likelihood of its having to pay 
$10,500 in damages. In contrast, damages of $10,000 give the manufacturer 
an incentive to spend only $100 per machine on the precaution. Therefore, it 
  
 135. Id. at 1160-62. 
 136. The connection between risk aversion and wealth has to do with economists’ 
definition of “risk aversion.” One ordinarily thinks of the concept of risk aversion as involv-
ing broad disfavoring of risks and losses for many psychological reasons, but economists 
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prefer to avoid risk is that because of the diminishing marginal utility of wealth, a 50/50 
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$110 and $100 is less than the difference between $100 and $90). To put it more starkly: 
even if people were purely rational and had no emotional reasons for disfavoring risk or 
overweighting losses compared to gains, they wouldn’t risk their one dinner tonight for an 
even chance between zero dinners and two dinners tonight. Zero dinners would be much 
worse than one, whereas two dinners wouldn’t be much better than one. This isn’t just a 
result of psychological disfavoring of risk; it’s a result of the value of two meals versus one 
versus zero. The same is often true of money, particularly if the sums are large enough. Ac-
cordingly, even purely rational people would be expected to turn down many fair, or even 
favorable, bets as long as they experience a diminishing marginal utility of wealth.  
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might not spend a greater amount to reduce the risk of breach from 25% to 
24%, even though this reduction is worth $105 to the buyer.137 
Like other alternative contract-damages models, this model is unad-
ministrable. It would be nearly impossible to measure the subjective valua-
tions that buyers put on slight reductions in the risk of breach. It would also 
be nearly impossible to isolate these slight effects from the much larger 
effects caused by preexisting wealth differences among promisees. A buyer 
with a net worth of $10 million will likely value any given increase in pre-
caution much less than would a buyer with a net worth of $100,000, and 
these preexisting wealth differences are likely to swamp the differences in 
wealth that result from differences in expected losses from breach.138 Per-
haps Craswell would suggest that these other wealth effects should be ac-
commodated too, but a remedial regime that considers such effects would 
break sharply from the common-law tradition against basing nonpunitive 
damages on a party’s wealth.139 
Moreover, because Craswell’s goal is to give promisors efficient in-
centives, under his model the subjective valuations of those promisees that 
happen to suffer harm from breach should not be controlling.140 To provide 
the efficient incentives that Craswell seeks to attain here, courts would have 
to average the subjective valuations of all of a seller’s promisees, and courts 
are particularly ill-equipped to make bulk determinations about the subjec-
tive valuations of individuals who are not parties. In other words, Craswell’s 
proposal depends not only on impossible-to-measure subjective valuations 
that a promisee puts on a promisor’s precaution, but even worse, on the im-
  
 137. Under a remedial regime that perfectly implements the indifference principle, 
promisees would face no risk of loss from breach, and therefore would be indifferent be-
tween a 25%-to-24% reduction, a 2%-to-1% reduction, or any similar reduction. At least 
theoretically, then, the indifference principle solves the problem that Craswell here address-
es. But, because in practice damages are imperfect, it is fair to assume, as Craswell does, that 
promisees face some risk from breach. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 989-97 (explaining the 
various reasons expectation damages will fall short of the indifference principle in practice). 
 138. Moreover, individuals tend to undervalue costs that may appear in the future, 
reducing even further the relevance of wealth effects based exclusively on expected costs 
deriving from the risk of breach. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and 
the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 222-25 (1995). Put simply, actual large wealth 
effects will swamp speculative small ones, perhaps to the point where it is unlikely the latter 
even exist.  
 139. See Michael J. Trebilcock, The Role of Insurance Considerations in the Choice 
of Efficient Civil Liability Rules, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 247 (1988) (“[A] given loss re-
duces the utility of a rich person less than a poor person . . . [but this is a consideration] that 
by long historical tradition in common law civil disputes the courts are supposed sedulously 
to eschew. If they were now to become influential in determinations of liability, they would 
cast courts in a radically new role.”). 
 140. Craswell, supra note 5, at 1169. 
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possible-to-measure subjective valuations of a group of promisees who are 
not in court.141 
E. Remedial Regimes Designed to Promote Efficient Behavior in Civil Dis-
pute Resolution 
Craswell has also identified a number of ways that contract law’s re-
medial regime can influence parties’ behavior in civil dispute resolution.142 
These effects tend to have opposing consequences. For instance, Craswell 
notes that damages measures that result in lower damages lead initially to 
fewer lawsuits because the expected value of any given lawsuit declines—
and this is desirable, because it reduces litigation costs.143 As a consequence, 
however, wrongdoers expect to pay less damages for their wrongs, which 
will lead them to cause more harm, which in turn tends to increase the num-
ber of lawsuits “even while the probability of any particular wrong being 
litigated had declined.”144 
Similarly, Craswell suggests that higher damages might increase liti-
gation or collection costs because they could cause courts and juries to de-
mand more proof, encourage defendants to invest more in litigation, or en-
courage defendants to find more elaborate ways to hide their assets.145 But 
higher damages also deter wrongs, and when there are fewer wrongs, plain-
tiffs have less reason to file claims; as a result, litigation costs may fall. The 
  
 141. Another problem with Craswell’s endeavor is that it does not properly accom-
modate the time interval between precaution and breach. For Craswell’s proposed regime to 
be effective, it would have to influence the seller’s decision at the time when she has the 
opportunity to take the precaution. Imagine that we could determine efficient incentives for 
the manufacturer to take a particular decision during the course of manufacture that would 
reduce the risk of breach from 25% to 24%. Suppose the window of opportunity to take this 
precaution runs from March 1 to March 31. Courts, when awarding damages, would aim to 
influence the seller’s decisions during that interval. As a result, courts could not take into 
account any information that became available after March 31—including, say, information 
about buyers’ new subjective values. But if damages awarded in the present are based on 
figures from the past, then they can give sellers perverse incentives for precaution in the 
present. For example, even if courts could calculate damages that provide the seller ideal 
incentives in March, this level of damages could give the manufacturer inefficient incentives 
to take an unrelated precaution in April or to recall a defective product in October (in view of 
the product’s then-estimated danger and the value that buyers place on being safe from this 
danger). In March, when the manufacturer has the opportunity to take the relevant precau-
tion, she would need to consider the subjective values of her buyers in and after September. 
But during the manufacture of a good, the class of buyers is often indeterminate: the very 
identities of the buyers are unclear, and even the rough characteristics of buyers in bulk may 
change during the course of a product’s design and manufacture. 
 142. Craswell, supra note 5, at 1169-70. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 1170. 
 145. Id. 
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elusive nature of these effects, and the fact that they point in opposite direc-
tions, suggests that they matter little for any practical analysis of contract 
law’s remedial regime.  
CONCLUSION 
In a well-known essay, Milton Friedman claimed that the task of posi-
tive economics is “to provide a system of generalizations that can be used to 
make correct predictions about the consequences of any change in circum-
stances.”146 Correspondingly, Friedman claimed, the validity of the assump-
tions underlying an economic model should not be judged by evaluating the 
assumptions directly. Instead, the assumptions should be judged according 
to whether the model yields sufficiently accurate predictions.147  
Neither of Friedman’s claims normally applies to law-and-economics 
remedial models. These models are almost invariably prescriptive, not pre-
dictive: their purpose is either to support an existing rule or to argue that an 
existing rule should be modified or replaced. To put this differently, law-
and-economics remedial models are usually normative, not positive. The 
prescriptive nature of these models is not a strike against them: there is 
nothing wrong with developing prescriptive rather than predictive models. 
However, the prescriptive nature of the models has three important implica-
tions.  
To begin with, Friedman’s claim that the validity of the assumptions 
underlying an economic model should be judged by the accuracy of the 
model’s predictions cannot support most remedial models, because it is al-
most impossible to empirically determine the efficiency effects of continu-
ing, modifying, or replacing an existing remedial rule. As Eric Posner has 
pointed out: 
To generate predictions, one would need a vast amount of information about the 
characteristics of the parties and the transactions. If one remedy is best when rene-
gotiation costs are high, and another is best when renegotiation costs are low, we 
need some way to measure renegotiation costs. If the optimal remedy depends on 
the shape of probability distributions for sellers’ costs and buyers’ valuations, we 
need this information as well. Yet no one has attempted to collect this information, 
and it is difficult to imagine how this task could be accomplished.148 
Accordingly, the validity of the assumptions that underlie a remedial 
model, and the legal regime it supports, must be evaluated directly, on the 
basis of prudential judgment, rather than by the model’s predictive success 
  
 146. MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN 
POSITIVE ECONOMICS 4 (1953).  
 147. Id. at 15.  
 148. Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Suc-
cess or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 838 (2003). 
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or formal validity. In law-and-economics—as opposed to straightforward 
microeconomics—the formal validity of a model is only a first test. Other 
tests are whether the legal regime suggested by a model is administrable, 
whether the model takes institutional considerations into account, and 
whether implementation of the model would involve more costs than bene-
fits. Recent proposed alternatives to the expectation measure fail these tests. 
Finally, each proposed alternative remedial model focuses on one or at 
most two remedial goals and disregards the rest.149 As a result, the goal or 
goals on which each model is based, and the remedial regime the model 
promotes, usually conflict with the goals on which other models are based 
and the regimes the other models promote. Such conflicts can be resolved 
only by giving primacy to one or two goals over the others. The choice of 
which goal or goals should be given primacy cannot be resolved by analyz-
ing the formal validity of the models that are driven by those goals or by 
measuring the extent to which the models are predictively sound. Accord-
ingly, to the extent the choice among goals is instrumental, the issue of pri-
macy can be resolved only by the application of sound prudential judgment 
concerning the importance of each goal in efficiency terms. Our own judg-
ment, which we believe is widely shared, is that the goals of achieving effi-
cient rates of precaution and performance and supporting surplus-enhancing 
reliance are more weighty—indeed, far more weighty—than the goals to be 
served by any of the alternative models.  
 
  
 149. Id.  
